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Nation Equity: Incidental Emotions in
Country-of-Origin Effects
DURAIRAJ MAHESWARAN
CATHY YI CHEN*
Different from past research on country-of-origin effects that has focused on cog-
nitive factors, this article examines the impact of incidental emotions and cognitive
appraisals associated with these emotions on country-of-origin effects. Experiment
1 compared anger and sadness and demonstrated that country of origin influenced
evaluations only in the angry (vs. sad) condition where human (vs. situation) control
was high. Experiment 2 further identified the effects of agency control using a
different emotion, frustration. Based on these observations, this article suggests
that, like brands, countries also have equity associated with them, termed “nation
equity,” that has both performance and emotional components.
The effect of country of origin on product evaluationshas been well documented. Several cognitive factors
such as processing goals and time delay moderate country-
of-origin effects on subsequent product evaluations (Gu¨r-
han-Canli and Maheswaran 2000b; Hong and Wyer 1989,
1990). Yet, other findings suggest affective influences. For
example, featuring Japan as the country of origin led to
favorable perceptions regardless of product quality for eth-
nocentric Japanese consumers (Gu¨rhan-Canli and Mahes-
waran 2000a). In contrast, Chinese consumers in Nanjing,
an enduring symbol of Japanese occupation, might not pur-
chase Japanese products because of animosity toward Japan
(Klein, Ettenson, and Morris 1998). Thus, the emotions con-
sumers feel toward a country may be a consequence of
historical events and be independent of the product, yet,
they may subsequently influence the use of country of origin
in product evaluations.
Recent research has shown that emotions have cognitive
consequences or appraisal dimensions associated with them.
For example, happiness is associated with certainty and hope
is associated with uncertainty appraisal dimensions. More
important, these appraisal dimensions systematically influ-
ence the effect of specific emotions on processing (Tiedens
and Linton 2001). We examine how the agency-control ap-
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praisal dimension influences the use of country of origin in
evaluations by featuring three discrete incidental emo-
tions—anger, sadness, and frustration—that vary along the
agency-control dimension.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Country-of-Origin Effects
Several studies documented that favorable or unfavorable
evaluations of a country associated with a product lead to
corresponding favorable or unfavorable evaluations of the
product (Gu¨rhan-Canli and Maheswaran 2000b; Hong and
Wyer 1989, 1990; Maheswaran 1994). In addition, past re-
search shows that motivational (e.g., involvement) or cog-
nitive (i.e., capacity) factors moderate country-of-origin ef-
fects. For example, Gu¨rhan-Canli and Maheswaran (2000b)
demonstrate that the processing goal and the type of infor-
mation will determine whether country of origin is used in
evaluations.
The dual-process models of persuasion have served as a
theoretical basis for understanding country-of-origin effects
(Chaiken 1980; Petty and Cacioppo 1979). Most early re-
search has assumed that information processing is driven
by the goal of forming accurate judgments, that is, accuracy
motivation. Accuracy-motivated people are likely to engage
in objective, systematic processing that will draw attention
to the message details and minimize the impact of heuristics.
In contrast, when people are not accuracy motivated, they
tend to engage in heuristic processing, and country of origin
has been shown to influence evaluations under such limited
processing (Agrawal and Maheswaran 2005b; Eagly and
Chaiken 1993).
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Incidental Emotions
Past research has shown that incidental emotions may
influence message persuasion (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, and
Kramer 1994; Tiedens and Linton 2001). The positive or
negative valence of the mood state has been extensively
shown to influence subsequent evaluations of a target (Bar-
one 2005). While generalized mood has been implicated in
persuasion, relatively little attention has been focused on
more specific emotions. Recent research has suggested that
specific emotions within a more general mood state may
have differential effects on persuasion. For example, anger
and sadness, emotions with negative valence, have asym-
metric effects on processing. Anger has been shown to in-
duce heuristic processing, and sadness leads to systematic
processing (Bodenhausen et al. 1994). More important, the
observed differences among similarly valenced specific
emotions have been attributed to the cognitive consequences
or the appraisal dimensions (e.g., uncertainty or agency)
associated with them (Lerner and Keltner 2000; Tiedens and
Linton 2001). For example, fear, an emotion that is asso-
ciated with risk, has been shown to have an incidental effect
on risk perceptions in a subsequent situation (DeSteno et
al. 2000; Lerner and Keltner 2000). Despite this growing
interest in emotions and persuasion, relatively little research
has examined the effects of emotions that are incidental to
the message on persuasion. More important, the process
mechanisms by which discrete emotions interact with mes-
sage features (e.g., country of origin) to influence persuasion
are not yet understood (Aaker and Williams 1998; Agrawal
and Maheswaran 2005a).
Hypotheses
We build on research on discrete emotions (Lerner and
Keltner 2000; Tiedens and Linton 2001) and argue that emo-
tions varying on the dimension of agency control (human
control or situation control) can influence the use of country
of origin on evaluations. We examine anger and sadness,
emotions that differ in terms of agency attribution (Smith
and Ellsworth 1985). People who are angry feel strongly
that other people can influence the situation or are respon-
sible for the situation. Hence, angry people tend to blame
someone else (human factors) for negative consequences.
In contrast, sad people tend to believe that the event is
beyond human control and are more prone to attribute neg-
ative consequences to situational characteristics. The agency
attribution related to an incidental emotion also influences
the weight given to human factors (vs. situational factors)
in a subsequent judgment (Keltner, Ellsworth, and Edwards
1993). For the same event (e.g., you miss an important
flight), people who are angry are more likely to perceive
other people (e.g., terrible cab driver) as the causal agent
in such event, whereas people who are sad are more likely
to perceive situational factors (e.g., bad traffic) as the causal
agent.
In our research, consumers are asked to evaluate a product
and are given the country of origin (source) of the product
and the product description. Angry participants are expected
to give more weight to human factors. This implies that they
are more likely to attribute product performance to people
who they think are responsible for manufacturing the prod-
uct. Since the country where the product originates is fea-
tured in the information given to participants, they will hold
the country responsible for its products. Thus, their product
evaluations would be greatly influenced by the favorableness
of the country-of-origin information. In contrast, sad par-
ticipants are anticipated to give less weight to human factors,
and thus, country of origin will only receive minimal at-
tention.
H1: In the anger condition, participants will evaluate
a product more favorably when its country-of-
origin information is favorable (vs. unfavorable).
Whereas in the sad condition, country-of-origin
information will not affect their evaluations.
We also examine the proposed agency differences in the
attribution of responsibility and expect that angry partici-
pants perceive a high degree of human control while sad
participants tend to believe the situation is beyond human
control.
H2: In the anger (vs. sad) condition, perceptions of
the human control will be higher, and perceptions
of the situation control will be lower.
Cognitive responses would provide convergent evidence
for agency-related processes that form the basis of country-
of-origin effects. If angry participants focus on country of
origin, then they should elaborate more on the country of
origin and generate more country-related thoughts. In ad-
dition, the valence of the country-of-origin-related thoughts
would be more favorable in response to a favorable (vs.
unfavorable) country of origin. In contrast, while country
of origin may also be scrutinized in the sad condition, it is
less likely to be elaborated on since it would have a relatively
low diagnostic value (Maheswaran 1994).
H3: In the anger (vs. sad) condition, participants will
generate more country-of-origin-related thoughts.
The valence of country-of-origin-related thoughts
will be more favorable when country-of-origin
information is favorable (vs. unfavorable). In con-
trast, participants in the sad (vs. anger) condition
will generate more attribute-related thoughts.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Two hundred and ten participants received partial course
credit for participating in small group sessions. They were
randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (emotion: sad vs.
anger) # 2 (country of origin: Japan vs. Taiwan) # 2
(description: superior vs. inferior) between-subjects design.
Participants learned that they would be participating in two
unrelated studies. The first study manipulated emotion by
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asking the participants to write down an emotional expe-
rience. The second study featured a new digital camera
(model SDM 1500) ostensibly manufactured in either Tai-
wan or Japan. The participants subsequently read a report
prepared by an independent agency that depicted the camera
as being either superior or inferior to two leading brands.
Then, the participants proceeded to complete the dependent
measures. After an open-ended suspicion probe, participants
were debriefed.
Independent Variables. Emotion was induced by ask-
ing participants to recall and reexperience an event that made
them very sad (angry) and then describe this event in great
detail by including as many concrete, vivid, experiential
aspects as possible (Lerner et al. 2003; Tiedens and Linton
2001). Japan and Taiwan were featured as the countries of
origin based on a pretest ( , ;M p 6.39 M p 3.98Japan Taiwan
, ). The superior (inferior) descrip-F(1, 36)p 89.49 p ! .001
tion featured the target camera as better than (not as good
as) two competing brands. Specifically, the camera was rep-
resented as superior in resolution, memory, zoom, and shut-
ter, equivalent in the signal/noise ratio, and inferior in size.
Dependent Measures. All dependent variables, except
for cognitive responses, were assessed using scales anchored
by one and seven. After writing about their emotional ex-
periences, participants responded to a few appraisal mea-
sures that generated an uncertainty index ( ), aap .69
human-control index ( ), and a situation-controlap .79
measure (Smith and Ellsworth 1985). Participants evaluated
the target camera on three seven-point scales anchored by
“positive” and “negative,” “not at all favorable” and “very
favorable,” and “good” and “bad.” These items were av-
eraged to form an evaluation index ( ). Then, par-ap .90
ticipants were given 3 minutes to list any thoughts that came
to their minds while reading about the camera. Two inde-
pendent raters categorized these thoughts as country of or-
igin related or attribute related (C, A) and as positive, neg-
ative, or neutral (+, , or 0; Maheswaran and Chaiken
1991). Interrater agreement was 95%, and the discrepancies
were resolved by discussion. Some examples are “Japanese
products must be of a good quality” (C+), “It is made in
Taiwan” (C0), “It is a Taiwanese brand hence [it] may not
be reliable” (C), “I really like the extra memory” (A+),
“It appears too heavy” (A), and “How much does it cost?”
(A0).
As a manipulation check for descriptions, participants
rated the extent to which the target product was portrayed
as “superior” and “inferior” to leading brands, having
“many” and “few positive” and “few” and “many negative”
attributes. These items were averaged to form a superiority
index ( ). Participants also rated the extent to whichap .90
they endorse each of 10 statements as a manipulation check
of emotions (Lerner and Keltner 2001). A sadness index
( ) and an anger index ( ) were generatedap .83 ap .73
based on their ratings. Age, gender, and ethnicity were in-
dicated in the end.
Results
Manipulation Checks. An ANOVA on emotion mea-
sures revealed only main effects of emotion. Participants in
the sad (vs. anger) condition reported greater sadness
( vs. ; ,M p 4.16 M p 3.42 F(1, 200)p 12.65 p !sad anger
) and less anger ( vs. ;.001 M p 2.52 M p 3.84sad anger
, ). An ANOVA on the superi-F(1, 198)p 38.95 p ! .001
ority index revealed only a main effect of description
( vs. ; ,M p 5.29 M p 3.27 F(1, 202)p 207.10 p !sup inf
). No differential effects were observed on gender and.001
age as covariates.
Evaluations. An ANOVA on the evaluation index
yielded a significant main effect of product description
( , ) and a significant emotion byF(1, 201)p 96.67 p ! .001
country-of-origin interaction ( , ).F(1, 201)p 6.63 pp .01
Consistent with hypothesis 1, the evaluations were sig-
nificantly higher when the country of origin was Japan
(vs. Taiwan) for angry participants ( vs.M p 5.14Japan
; , ) but did not dif-M p 4.65 F(1, 201)p 6.22 p ! .05Taiwan
fer for sad participants ( vs. ;M p 4.60 M p 4.82Japan Taiwan
, ).F(1, 201)p 1.30 p 1 .25
Appraisal Measures. An ANOVA revealed no signif-
icant effect for the uncertainty index ( ). Consis-p’s 1 .20
tent with hypothesis 2, the human-control index was signif-
icantly higher in the anger (vs. sad) condition (M panger
vs. ; , ). The4.80 M p 3.56 F(1, 202)p 35.14 p ! .001sad
situation-control measure was significantly higher in the
sad (vs. anger) condition ( vs. ;M p 4.32 M p 3.08sad anger
, ).F(1, 202)p 21.74 p ! .001
Cognitive Responses. An ANOVA on the total number
of thoughts yielded no significant effects ( ;Mp 5.23 p 1
). Consistent with hypothesis 3, angry (vs. sad) partici-.20
pants generated more country-of-origin-related thoughts
( vs. ; , )M p .25 M p .15 F(1, 197)p 2.79 p ! .10anger sad
and fewer attribute-related thoughts ( vs.M p 1.63anger
; , ). An ANOVA onM p 2.16 F(1, 197)p 4.42 p ! .05sad
the valenced index of country-of-origin-related thoughts
( thoughts) revealed an emotion bypositive negative
country-of-origin interaction ( , ).F(1, 197)p 4.38 p ! .05
For angry participants, the valence of country-of-origin-
related thoughts was more favorable if the product was
manufactured in Japan (vs. Taiwan; vs.M p .09Japan
; , ). For sad par-M p .30 F(1, 197)p 25.64 p ! .001Taiwan
ticipants, such difference was not significant (M p .05Japan
vs. ; , ). The meansM p .06 F(1, 197)p 1.97 p 1 .15Taiwan
and standard deviations are presented in table 1.
Discussion
In sum, this experiment demonstrated that sadness and
anger differentially influence the use of country-of-origin
information in product evaluations. Angry participants were
more influenced by the favorableness of the country-of-
origin information. In contrast, country of origin did not
influence the evaluations of sad participants reliably.
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TABLE 1
EVALUATIONS (STANDARD DEVIATIONS) AND THOUGHTS AS A FUNCTION OF EMOTION, COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, AND PRODUCT
DESCRIPTION: EXPERIMENT 1
Sad Anger
Superior description Inferior description Superior description Inferior description
Japan Taiwan Japan Taiwan Japan Taiwan Japan Taiwan
Evaluations 5.57 (.81) 5.40 (.58) 3.63 (1.10) 4.23 (1.27) 5.73 (.98) 5.17 (.95) 4.55 (.96) 4.13 (.99)
Country-of-origin-related
thoughts .14 (.35) .20 (.40) .00 (.00) .26 (.52) .08 (.27) .39 (.58) .09 (.29) .44 (.64)
Valenced index of country-
of-origin-related thoughts .10 (.31) .08 (.57) .00 (.00) .04 (.19) .09 (.19) .17 (.39) .09 (.29) .41 (.64)
Attribute-related thoughts 1.93 (1.58) 2.16 (1.72) 2.35 (2.04) 2.22 (1.83) 2.00 (1.98) 1.15 (1.51) 1.83 (1.64) 1.59 (1.67)
Valenced index of attribute
thoughts .00 (1.49) .96 (1.74) .26 (1.44) .18 (1.00) .96 (2.10) .48 (1.38) 1.04 (1.58) .04 (1.53)
In experiment 1, we used two different emotions, anger
and sadness. While we were able to show that anger and
sadness have differential effects on the use of country-of-
origin information, it is not clear what mechanism is driving
these differences. Although the appraisal measures suggest
that agency attribution may explain the results, the control
related to these emotions was only measured. However, an-
ger and sadness may vary on other appraisals that were not
measured in this study (e.g., arousal, attention, and effort).
It is possible that some unique characteristics associated with
the type of emotions featured (anger or sadness), such as
physiological brain activity, might have led to our results.
To address these issues, in experiment 2, we manipulate the
agency attribution (human vs. situation control) within the
same emotion, frustration. Using the same emotion and ma-
nipulating the two agency attributions helps us to uniquely
identify the mechanism underlying the above effects.
EXPERIMENT 2
Frustration
Frustration was chosen because past research has shown
that it is in the middle of the agency-control dimension:
“Frustration was associated with moderately strong apprais-
als of both situational control and other-responsibility/con-
trol” (Smith and Ellsworth 1985, 833). The middle location
suggests that frustration can be accompanied by an appraisal
of human control under some conditions and an appraisal
of situation control in other circumstances. For example, a
student may feel frustrated for doing poorly on an exam for
which she felt well prepared. The frustration may be ac-
companied by a high situational (impersonal) control if the
student attributed the poor performance to a mysterious bad
flu on the exam day or be accompanied by a high human
control if she attributed it to the instructor for featuring
examination questions that deviated significantly from the
review guideline. This particular feature of frustration gives
us the flexibility to induce this emotion with either situa-
tional control or human control and, thus, test the account
of agency control using only one type of emotion. Based
on our theorizing,
H4: Under human control, participants will evaluate
the product more favorably when its country of
origin is favorable (vs. unfavorable). While under
situation control, country-of-origin information
will not affect evaluations.
H5: Under human (vs. situation) control, partici-
pants will generate more country-of-origin-related
thoughts. The valence of country-of-origin-related
thoughts will be more favorable when country of
origin is favorable (vs. unfavorable). In contrast,
under situation (vs. human) control, participants
will generate more attribute-related thoughts.
Method
One hundred and eighty-one participants were randomly
assigned to conditions in a 2 (agency control: situation
vs. human) # 2 (country of origin: Japan vs. Taiwan) # 2
(argument strength: strong vs. weak) between-subjects de-
sign. The experimental procedures and major dependent
measures were identical to those in experiment 1. Partici-
pants in the situational-agency condition recalled the time
when they felt intensely frustrated because of impersonal or
situational factors, while participants in the human-agency
condition recalled a frustrating time because of other peo-
ple’s speech or action (Keltner et al. 1993; Lerner et al.
2003). The target camera was described to be superior to
the two competing brands on important features (e.g., picture
quality) in the strong-argument condition but superior on
less important features (e.g., color of the camera bag) in the
weak-argument condition (Maheswaran, Mackie, and Chai-
ken 1992). As a check of the frustration manipulation, par-
ticipants rated the level of their agreements to three state-
ments: “I did not feel frustrated the slightest bit” (reverse
scored), “I felt frustrated again when I recalled it,” and
“I felt frustrated even more strongly than ever before.”
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TABLE 2
EVALUATIONS (STANDARD DEVIATIONS) AND THOUGHTS AS A FUNCTION OF EMOTION, COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, AND PRODUCT
DESCRIPTION: EXPERIMENT 2
Frustration—situation agency Frustration—human agency
Strong argument Weak argument Strong argument Weak argument
Japan Taiwan Japan Taiwan Japan Taiwan Japan Taiwan
Evaluations 5.05 (.81) 5.70 (.70) 3.74 (.72) 3.45 (1.09) 5.36 (.87) 5.01 (1.03) 4.02 (.89) 3.48 (.96)
Country-of-origin-related
thoughts .00 (.00) .27 (.45) .09 (.29) .09 (.29) .17 (.38) .38 (.74) .14 (.35) .21 (.41)
Valenced index of country-
of-origin-related thoughts .00 (.00) .09 (.29) .00 (.00) .04 (.21) .04 (.21) .24 (.54) .14 (.35) .13 (.34)
Attribute-related thoughts 4.33 (2.53) 4.14 (1.83) 4.73 (2.18) 3.86 (1.91) 4.30 (2.28) 2.86 (1.71) 4.18 (1.94) 3.04 (1.73)
Valenced index of attribute
thoughts 1.91 (2.13) 2.14 (1.81) 1.50 (2.46) 1.04 (2.29) 1.61 (2.02) 1.33 (1.80) 1.73 (1.61) 1.54 (1.53)
The three items were averaged to form a frustration index
( ).ap .73
Results and Discussion
Manipulation Checks. Participants experienced the
same extent of frustration in all conditions (all ).p’s 1 .50
Data revealed no significant effect ( ) for thep’s 1 .10
uncertainty index ( ). In the human (vs. situa-ap .62
tion) agency condition, the human-control index (ap
) was significantly higher ( vs..75 M p 4.94 M phuman sit
; , ) and the situational-con-3.99 F(1, 173)p 13.60 p ! .001
trol measure was lower ( vs. ;M p 2.75 M p 3.92human sit
, ). A MANOVA with the av-F(1, 173)p 21.74 p ! .001
erage ratings of the three important and three less important
attributes as a within-subject repeated measure revealed a
significant effect of attributes ( vs.M p 6.27 M pimp less imp
; , ).3.51 F(1, 173)p 866.66 p ! .001
Evaluations. An ANOVA on the evaluation index
( ) yielded a significant main effect of argumentap .93
strength ( , ) and a significantF(1, 172)p 145.46 p ! .001
control by country-of-origin interaction ( ,F(1, 172)p 5.34
). Consistent with hypothesis 4, human-agency par-p ! .05
ticipants evaluated the target product more favorably when
the country of origin was Japan (vs. Taiwan; M p 4.69Japan
vs. ; , ). However,M p 4.25 F(1, 172)p 5.37 p ! .05Taiwan
country of origin did not influence the evaluations of the
situational-agency participants ( vs.M p 4.40 M pJapan Taiwan
; , ).4.57 F(1, 172)p .89 p 1 .30
Cognitive Responses. An ANOVA on the total number
of thoughts yielded no significant effects ( ;Mp 5.40 p 1
). In accord with hypothesis 5, human (vs. situation).11
agency participants generated more country-of-origin-related
thoughts ( vs. ; ,M p .22 M p .11 F(1, 172)p 3.32human sit
) and fewer attribute-related thoughts (p ! .10 M phuman
vs. ; , ). An3.60 M p 4.26 F(1, 172)p 4.82 p ! .05sit
ANOVA on the valenced index of country-of-origin-related
thoughts revealed a control by country-of-origin interac-
tion ( , ). For human-agency partic-F(1,172)p 5.41 p ! .05
ipants, the valence index was more favorable if the product
was manufactured in Japan (vs. Taiwan; vs.M p .09Japan
; , ), while suchM p .19 F(1, 172)p 19.28 p ! .001Taiwan
a difference was not significant for situation-agency partic-
ipants ( vs. ; ,M p .00 M p .07 F(1, 172)p 1.22Japan Taiwan
). The means and standard deviations are presentedp 1 .25
in table 2.
Consistent with our predictions, experiment 2 showed that
frustrated participants who feel strongly that other people
are responsible for the situation hold a country responsible
for its products. Their product evaluations are influenced by
the favorableness of the country of origin. In contrast, frus-
trated people who believe that the situation is beyond human
control do not hold a country responsible for its products,
and their evaluations are not influenced by the country of
origin.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The two experiments featured in this research document
the incidental effects of specific emotions on use of country-
of-origin information in evaluations. This research also iden-
tifies agency control as the underlying dimension that de-
termines country-of-origin effects under these emotions.
These findings extend our knowledge of the emotional as-
pects of country-of-origin effects in several ways. Next, we
discuss the contributions of this research to our understand-
ing of country-of-origin effects and cognitive appraisals.
Extending Country-of-Origin Effects
Past research has examined the cognitive and motivational
influences on country-of-origin effects. We extend these
findings to suggest that specific incidental emotions also
influence country-of-origin effects. We show that country-
of-origin perceptions transcend product efficacy and may
have their origins in social and political circumstances. Re-
search has shown that consumers have animosity toward
certain countries because of historical circumstances and that
such animosity influences their subsequent purchase behav-
ior (Klein et al. 1998). While we did not specifically examine
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animosity effect, our findings could be construed as docu-
menting the moderating role of incidental emotions on an-
imosity. We show that animosity will only be observed when
anger (vs. sadness) is induced. We also show that the cog-
nitive appraisals associated with these emotions, such as
agency control, will determine when animosity effects will
be observed. Specifically, we suggest that the use of country
perceptions in evaluations will depend on whether the per-
ceiver attributes the event to the country or to a generalized
turn of events that perpetrated them.
Emotions and Persuasion
Our research adds to the growing body of literature that
contends that the effect of emotions on judgment extends
beyond the valence of mood. It suggests that specific emo-
tions such as anger, sadness, or frustration, despite sharing
a common, negative valence, may have distinct effects on
processing and judgments. We also reinforce the view that
emotions have a carryover effect on evaluations. For ex-
ample, emotions induced in one situation may influence
judgments in another situation. Our findings provide con-
verging evidence for the incidental effect of emotions in the
context of country of origin (Tiedens and Linton 2001). In
addition, our findings highlight the usefulness of understand-
ing the cognitive consequences that are associated with dif-
ferent emotions. We show that such appraisals account for
the observed differences of specific emotions that transcend
valence effects. Past research has shown that anger induces
heuristic processing and sadness promotes systematic pro-
cessing. However, the underlying mechanism was not clearly
understood (Bodenhausen et al. 1994). We show that the
differential agency attribution that is associated with these
emotions may account for these differences. We also provide
insights on the effects of a new emotion, frustration, and
demonstrate that the same emotion may lead to different
outcomes, depending on the appraisals associated with them.
Limitations and Future Direction
A few issues that emerged from this research may merit
further inquiry. First, although previous research has char-
acterized sadness as an emotion associated more with un-
certainty than anger, our research demonstrates that the ma-
jor difference between the two emotions is agency control
rather than uncertainty. In Smith and Ellsworth’s (1985)
multidimensional analysis, sadness is found in the middle
of the uncertainty-certainty dimension, which suggests that
certainty may not be a central dimension for sadness. Tie-
dens and Linton (2001) also characterize sadness as a mal-
leable emotion that can be associated with both high and
low uncertainty. In our research, whether the specific mea-
surement on agency control has diluted the differences be-
tween anger and sadness measured on uncertainty merits
further examination. Second, while past research may pre-
dict a reliable emotion by argument-quality interaction, it
was not significant in our research. One possibility is that
people engaged in relatively high levels of processing across
emotional conditions. However, it is also likely that agency
control specifically directed attention at country of origin,
rather than influencing overall elaboration. Future research
should examine when each of these mechanisms are likely
to be present. Third, we examined negative emotions and
provided a potential explanation for animosity effects.
Country-of-origin research has shown that the perception of
a country could induce either animosity or halo effects. As
in animosity effects, the underlying process mechanisms
driving halo effects have not been understood. It is likely
that positive emotions could also have a differential effect
on the use of country of origin. For example, happiness
could induce a halo effect, or perception of the country that
is more favorable than warranted by the facts. It would be
useful to examine positive emotions and identify the relevant
appraisals. In addition, the degree of sadness or anger may
differ in each emotion group. Emotions may influence prod-
uct evaluation through an affect-transfer process. Also, var-
ious contexts, situations, and motivations might lead con-
sumers to experience different emotions that may then affect
how consumers process information (Jain, Agrawal, and
Maheswaran 2006; Jain et al. 2007; Maheswaran and Agra-
wal 2004). These effects need to be examined.
Finally, our findings suggest that, like brands, countries
also have equity associated with them, termed “nation eq-
uity,” that goes beyond product perceptions and may also
have an emotional component. More important, we show
that incidental emotions that are unrelated to product per-
formance may lead to a focus on the nation where the prod-
uct originated. This implies that nation equity may be vul-
nerable to incidental emotions and agency attributions
arising from events that are beyond the immediate purview
of a company. For example, political events, such as the
conflict in the Middle East, may either lead to a country or
situational attribution. Our findings suggest that if attribu-
tions were to be made to the country that has negative as-
sociations stemming from the conflict, it would lead to an
unfavorable evaluation of the product. However, if the at-
tributions were to be made to the situation, despite the neg-
ative associations to the country, it may not have an effect
on product evaluations. For example, American Express, by
virtue of its brand-name association to the United States,
may be unfavorably evaluated if a segment of the current
users in the Middle East attribute the conflict to the United
States. Alternately, if the attribution were to be made to the
situation, then American Express is not likely to be affected.
Hence, companies should anticipate and minimize the effect
of incidental emotions that are induced by national events
by designing strategies that mitigate such emotional in-
fluences. Future research should investigate the various
dimensions of nation equity and identify emotions and
the related cognitive appraisal dimensions that are likely
to dilute or enhance nation equity. Finally, a theoretical
framework based on the concept of nation equity may fa-
cilitate the integration of disparate research in the domain
of country-of-origin effects.
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